Thinking about the Arctic as a whole conjures images of snow, extreme weather, vast ice-covered landscapes and seascapes, polar bears. The bustling markets of New Delhi or the Great Wall of China do not frequently come to mind, but these are places that might be closely associated with the future Arctic. As the world eyes the potential for resources and development in the Far North, countries as diverse as China, India, Japan, Spain and Italy are seeking a role for themselves.
What are these countries doing, or what do they want to be doing, in the Arctic? In public statements, the main emphasis is clear: science. China, for example, has built a research station in the Svalbard Islands and is building an 8,000-tonne icebreaker. Other countries are similarly interested in the Arctic as the "canary in the coal mine" that can teach them about how climate change will affect their own states. They are also interested in potential access to the vast hydrocarbons and resources in the region, as well as international transit routes passing over the top of the globe.
Given the growing focus on the region, the broader question of who is in and who is out in the Arctic is coming to the fore. The Arctic Council – the main body for co-operation in the region – is struggling with this question.
The eight Arctic Council states are divided. Norway, Finland and Denmark have spoken openly about the need to bring more non-Arctic states into the fold, while Canada and Russia have been most averse to the idea of extending permanent observer status in the council to more non-Arctic states.
On the one hand, some fear that admitting more non-Arctic states (and international organizations) to permanent observer status would dilute the important voice that indigenous groups (the permanent participants) have in Arctic Council meetings. The simple fact that indigenous peoples have a formal place at the table is one of the Arctic Council's central claims to innovativeness.
On the other hand, if non-Arctic states are not given a permanent role to play in the council, will they be forced to raise Arctic issues in venues where Arctic states are a minority, like the United Nations General Assembly? Over time, would this reduce the Arctic states' ability to control the Arctic agenda?
Even if non-Arctic states are invited to become "permanent observers" to the Arctic Council, they will not hold the same rights, powers and obligations of Arctic states. Members will continue to have far more power than their observer counterparts. Admitting more non-Arctic observers into the Arctic Council may actually yield beneficial results. For example, setting membership fees for observers to support the permanent participants could help to facilitate a stronger indigenous voice by making sure their representatives not only have a seat at council and working group tables, but that they can actually get there to participate.
Canada will take over the chair of the Arctic Council in 2013 and should be prepared to face these questions. The debate over the balance between Arctic states, indigenous groups and non-Arctic states in the Arctic Council continues, but it is clear that non-Arctic states are interested in the tremendous changes taking place in the circumpolar world. Their interest is not a fleeting fancy. Arctic states and leaders need to discern how best to harness this growing interest to generate positive engagement and greater opportunities for Arctic residents.
P. Whitney Lackenbauer is chair of the history department at the University of Waterloo and co-chair of the Arctic Peoples and Security Pillar of the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program.