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andrew steele

British Prime Minister David Cameron welcomes Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg to 10 Downing Street for their first day of coalition government on May 12, 2010.Getty Images

Samuel Butler said that neither sarcasm nor irony are arguments. As such, let's leave unsaid the sarcasms and ironies of the British Conservative Party forming a coalition less than two years after the Canadian Conservative Party called them an " undemocratic seizure of power."

Instead, the more interesting question is why Stephen Harper in 2006 and David Cameron in 2010 behaved so differently.

Winning a plurality of 40 per cent of the seats in the Commons in 2006, Mr. Harper chose to govern moment-to-moment. He has nothing but the threat of an election as a tool to sustain confidence. He not only eschewed a coalition, but refused to find a stable partner for maintaining confidence as previous Canadian minority governments have done.

In Britain, David Cameron enjoys a plurality of 47 per cent of seats in the Commons, more than Mr. Harper did in 2006 or even the Canadian PM's standing since the 2008 election. And yet the British Tory chose to enter into a formal coalition arrangement with Cabinet seats for the third place party, the Liberal Democrats.

Why the Canadian high-wire act and the British belts-and-suspenders approach? Quite simply, because Cameron can and because Cameron must.

For starters, Stephen Harper has no dance partner. The closest party to the Canadian Conservatives ideologically are the Liberals, who are the second largest party and the alternative government. For reasons of history, culture and pragmatism, formally sustaining the Conservatives would be anathema to them.

The Liberals wish to form an alternative regime, not support the Conservatives even as junior partners. More so, the Conservatives ran specifically against the Liberal Party; to form a coalition with them after the election would have been unimaginable.

The only other conceivable coalition partner for the Conservatives has been the Bloc Quebecois in an informal agreement on the basis of decentralization. Certainly, the reaction of the CPC base to the proposed coalition's reliance on Bloc votes in 2008 shows the wisdom in not dancing with that particular partner.

The British Tory has a centrist third-party in the Liberal Democrats with whom he can form an alliance. That is not to ignore the major policy differences between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats on Europe, climate change, social services and taxes. And policy may be the easy part.

The two parties are rooted in wholly different political traditions. The Lib-Dems coming from the remnants of the once-mighty Liberals and the Whigs before them, combined with breakaway elements of moderate Labourites (remember the " Gang of Four?") Moreover, the voter and activists bases are made up of very different kinds of people.

However, there are also points of commonality, a common enemy in Labour, and, perhaps most important, a common interest: taking power. So, a Tory-LibDem deal was possible, but the question remains why it was necessary.

David Cameron has serious work to do. His country is running a massive deficit at 11 per cent of GDP. (In comparison, Canada's deficit is under 3 per cent of GDP.) Continuing on the present path for Britain risks Greek-style bankruptcy in the medium-term.

The British are going to have to cut very deeply. The last election was fought on the issue of when to cut, with the Conservatives saying "now" and the Liberal Democrats and Labour saying "after the recovery is secured."

By lashing Liberal Democrat hands to his knife, Mr. Cameron can try to get enough legitimacy to undertake that cutting sooner rather than later, and with a clear and reliable majority of MPs in favour. In contrast, Mr. Harper in 2006 inherited a country that was, all things considered, doing okay.

Consider that the previous three federal transitions occurred under the spectre of existential crisis, be they constitutional (1980), fiscal (1984) or both (1993). But the 2006 transfer of power occurred at a time of relative constitutional peace and financial stability.

Muddling through looked to be an acceptable way to run Canada in 2006. It wasn't going to work in Britain in 2010. The principle lesson from Britain is that coalitions are needed when legitimacy is required.

Past coalitions in Britain occurred during the massive crises of the First World War, the Depression, and the Second World War, when the government was absolutely required to have popular legitimacy with the broad swath of society.

The next few years will feature endless challenges for David Cameron: traumatic reductions in social spending, two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a European fiscal crisis, the potential for renewed violence in Northern Ireland, the certainty of terrorist plots. But the coalition lends his government durability and legitimacy through those inevitable political crises.

Let us not forget that the 2008 coalition crisis in Canada was sparked when the federal government lost legitimacy by falling out of line with Canadian public opinion, the global consensus, and the mood of Parliament with its stand-pat Economic Statement. Suddenly isolated, the Harper ministry lost public legitimacy. The subsequent bombast was about delegitimizing the alternative and buying time. It was only when the Harper government moved back into line with the public on economics with the 2009 budget that its legitimacy was repaired.

By joining in a formal coalition with the Liberal Democrats, Mr. Cameron lends his ministry unquestionable legitimacy and a mandate to govern. For a rookie Prime Minister facing multiple crises, sturdy legitimacy is worth a handful of cabinet seats.

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