In this Oct. 28, 2000 file photo, Cuba's President Fidel Castro, left, talks with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez in Barinas, Venezuela, near Chavez's hometown of Sabaneta.Jose Goitia/The Associated Press
The strange politics of Venezuela produce some startling anachronisms. Gas that costs less than tap water has kept enormous 1975 Buicks on the roads. Soft-focus photographs of the dear, departed leader beam down from the walls in public buildings.
And then there is Cuba.
The regime in Havana is viewed as a spent force, a historical relic, in the rest of the world, but Cuban influence in Venezuela is strong and growing.
As the country's economic implosion accelerates, and its "new socialist" regime is increasingly imperiled, it becomes harder all the time to know what's really going on or who is in charge. But in every conversation about what's happening in Miraflores Palace, from which the president (or someone) rules, Cuba comes up.
This relationship began with the late president Hugo Chavez, who was so close to Fidel Castro that they reportedly spoke on the phone at least once a day. Mr. Chavez cited Mr. Castro as a great thinker on whose work he would model the new, more-just Venezuela he pledged to build.
Mr. Chavez supplied Cuba with 100,000 barrels of oil a day, and lobbied to gain Cuba greater acceptance in the region.
In return, Cuba sent thousands of doctors to staff public health clinics, as part of Mr. Chavez's great project to provide health care through the oil revenues. That was the official contribution.
But Mr. Castro and his inner circle also taught Mr. Chavez how to run an intelligence apparatus, how to manage propaganda (by taking over the media, often through shell companies), and how to instill a public fear operation that promoted self-censorship and stifled dissent.
Mr. Chavez went to Cuba for his medical treatment when he was diagnosed with cancer (although Brazil and the United States, among others, also offered treatment), and he died there last March (although many Venezuelans believe he died well before it was announced, in order to give the Cubans time to manage the transition.)
The new president, Nicolas Maduro, is reported to have Cuban connections of his own. A bus driver turned union leader, he has seemed like almost an accidental president, but there are two strong theories that that's far from the case. In one version, put forth by Cuban exiles critical of the socialist alliance, Mr. Maduro attended Cuba's political leadership institute, Escuela Nico Lopez, in the 1980s. The other theory says that he went to Havana as a union leader in the 1980s – but that either way, he was a known and approved quantity for the Castro brothers, and thus was tapped for the job ahead of other more popular or qualified candidates.
There is a widely-held belief that Havana's influence is as strong or stronger than it was when Mr. Chavez was alive.
The bodyguards around Mr. Chavez, Venezuelans says, were always Cubans, and now the ones around his successor are too. There are reported to be senior "advisers" from Cuba working in the police force.
Lawyers in Caracas talk about how Cubans are now in charge of all the notary offices and public registries (in which all transactions such as real estate sales and business deals must be registered.) Some people think it's because they are pushing for a ban on public property; others say it's a way of keeping tabs on exactly who is buying and selling what (and maybe making money.)
Control in Caracas gives Havana access to the oil transfers set up by Mr. Chavez, and also, many people believe, to the direct revenue stream from the national oil company, much of the profit of which is diverted directly into the unaudited accounts of the "social missions" it funds. With control of Miraflores comes an outsize if unspoken political influence the Castros and their cronies do not have from their isolated island.
It seems likely that in the coming months Venezuela's economic collapse will force some sort of political change, but it is not clear what part Havana may play in this. The military may be a key actor in any transition, but the intentions of its leaders are opaque. Mr. Chavez was one of their own, but they are known to resent the Cuban interference in sovereign affairs. The Cuban-trained propaganda machine, however, continues to maintain popular support for the Chavez vision.