There was a time, not very long ago, that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was viewed throughout most of the Arab world as something of a hero. He had shown that a moderate, Islamic-oriented political party could be elected and govern effectively in a democracy, taking the place of military-backed rulers.
In his 2011 visit to Egypt, Mr. Erdogan was treated like a rock star – enormous crowds pressed forward wherever he went, hoping to get a glimpse of him, to touch his sleeve. Egyptian democracy was just starting to bloom following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and people in Cairo and Alexandria hoped to learn from the example of the great Turkish democrat.
A year earlier, in Gaza, I stood with thousands of Palestinians as they waited for their ship to come in. An international flotilla of "aid" vessels, under the direction of the Turkish flag ship, the Mavi Marmara, was hoping to puncture the blockade of the Hamas government in Gaza that Israel had maintained for three years.
Looking around the tiny fishing harbour of Gaza City that day, I noted there were more Turkish flags on display than Palestinian flags, and more pictures of Recep Tayyip Erdogan than of any Palestinian leader, be it Ismail Haniyeh, Khaled Meshaal or the late Yasser Arafat.
As far as these conflict-weary people were concerned, Mr. Erdogan could do no wrong. After all, he was the most prominent international leader to stand up to the Israelis, expressing solidarity with Palestinians. He had denounced Israel for its heavy-handed attack on Hamas in Gaza in 2008-09, and he even had set off an international incident when he walked off the stage of a live televised discussion with Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos, Switzerland. The Turkish leader had considered the discussion too pro-Israeli.
Such gestures were all the more appreciated by Palestinians coming as they did from the leader of a country closely allied with Israel (the two nations even conducted military exercises together).
In those days, Turkey was making a concerted effort to win a great many friends in its neighbourhood. The country's imaginative Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, had coined the phrase "zero problems with our neighbours" as the basis for Ankara's foreign policy and, for a while, it seemed to be working.
Turkey stood in good stead with nations as diverse as Israel and the Palestinians, Syria, Iran and Iraq. It even looked as if the historic animosity with countries such as Greece and Armenia, would be things of the past.
In 2010, however, it started to come undone; first with Israel. The Turkish-led flotilla never made it to the Palestinian shore that day in Gaza. Israeli commandos boarded the Mavi Marmara and nine Turks were killed as the vessel was commandeered. The event set off an international firestorm that still smoulders today, with each country withdrawing its ambassador from the other.
Then, in Baghdad, Turkey made no secret of its support for Iraq's Sunni Muslims, who had fared badly in the sectarian fighting and national elections that divided the country. When the Sunni Vice President, Tareq al-Hashemi, was tried in absentia and sentenced to death for an alleged role in the bombing of Iraqi Shiites, Mr. Erdogan criticised the charges as being politically motivated and gave asylum to Mr. Hashemi, much to the anger of Iraq's Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
However, as Arab uprisings began in 2011, Turkey looked to make new friends among the newly democratic countries. Things seemed particularly promising where Islamic-oriented parties were vying for power.
In Syria, however, Bashar al-Assad shocked his good friend Mr. Erdogan by ignoring the Turkish leader's advice and using deadly force against pro-democracy protesters. Mr. Erdogan felt he had no choice but to declare his support for the Syrian opposition. Members of the Free Syrian Army were allowed to set up shop inside Turkey and large refugee camps were constructed to house hundreds of thousands of Syrian "guests." It became an open secret that weapons were being supplied to the rebel forces by way of Turkey.
Not only did this turn of events mean the loss of another friend, Syria (and the expulsion of Turkey's ambassador), but it also upset Iran, that was backing the Assad regime.
Then came the political debacle in Egypt, culminating in the army's ouster of president Mohammed al-Morsi this past summer. Mr. Erdogan had invested a lot of political capital in Mr. Morsi, viewing him as a kindred Islamic leader, and came down hard on the army generals who overthrew him. Mr. Erdogan's incessant criticism of the Egyptian authorities made the former "rock star" persona non-grata in the country that once idolized him. Yet another Turkish ambassador was ordered out of a country.
Indeed, by the end of October, just about the only parties with which Turkey was not in conflict were the Kurdistan Government in northern Iraq and the Hamas government in Gaza. The policy of "zero problems" had become more one of "zero friends."
Since summer, however, Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Davutoglu have launched a new charm offensive, starting with Iran and Iraq, the two powerful Shia countries.
When the United States and other members of the P5+1 made an interim deal with Iran over its controversial nuclear program, Mr. Davutoglu was among the first to arrive in Tehran to congratulate the Iranian government. Their two countries' differences over Syria were suddenly glossed over.
In fact, at about the same time the Turkish Foreign Minister was making nice with Tehran, Turkish authorities announced they had uncovered a supply of Turkish-made mortar rounds that were destined for rebels in Syria. Ankara as much as said it was "shocked, shocked" to learn that arms were being smuggled to the Syrian opposition.
Similarly, when Iraq complained about a controversial oil pipeline deal Turkey had made with the Kurdistan Regional Government without going through the federal oil authorities in Baghdad, Ankara, for a change, deferred to Baghdad and asked it to iron out the problems with the provincial Iraqi government in Kurdistan.
The common denominator in all these regional relationships is oil, the one thing Turkey, with a powerful developed economy, sorely lacks. Mr. Erdogan's vaunted foreign policy has gone from one of neutrality, to sectarianism and now to pure commercialism.
With sanctions being peeled back in Iran, Turkey wants a big share of its oil exports; with Kurdistan's oil wealth about to be harvested, Turkey wants control of the pipelines that will bring it oil and gas.
Indeed, the lure of hydrocarbons may well repair Turkey's relations with Israel, now an exporter of natural gas from its newly-developed gas field in the Mediterranean waters off its coast.
So much for principle. Soon, Mr. Erdogan may resort to using a saying of one of his country's former presidents, Suleyman Demirel (1993-2000). Mr. Demirel, a pragmatist par excellence, famously said: "Yesterday is yesterday, and today is today."